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Abstract
Development of industrial plantation forest is a form of principal-agent relationship, in which the Ministry of 
Forestry as a principal gives utilization permit to the entrepreneur as an agent, known as the Forest Timber Product 
Exploitation Permit on Planted Forest.  This utilization permit obtained by the agents is operationally conducted by 
other parties through a cooperative agreement.  The purpose of this study is to obtain an information regarding to the 
state position in the development of industrial plantation forest.  The study was conducted in Riau Province, using the 
constructivist paradigm with phenomenological method. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews to selected 
informants.  Data were also obtained from the review of documents to complement the interview.  Data analysis was 
conducted using property rights and principal agent theories.  The phenomenon of multi-chain transfer of the 
management rights of plantation forest that  occoured in the observed companies showed that the state was unable to 
effectively control to the forest plantation.  The study recommends that state should issue regulation to decrease or 
stops further transfer of  the management rights of plantation forest.  However, further study needs to overcome the 
existing over accumulation of plantation forest in a few hands.
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Introduction
The form authority of production forest utilization permit 
during the regional autonomy era in the context of the 
authority division is regulated in Government Regulation 
(Peraturan Pemerintah, PP) Number 25/2000 jo 
Government Regulation Number 38/2007 regarding to the 
division of powers between the government, the provincial 
government and district/city local government.  The form of 
authority is also mentioned in the Government Regulation 
Number 34/2002 jo Government Regulation Number 7/2006 
jo Government Regulation Number 3/2008, in which the 
Ministry of Forestry acts as the authority holder.  During 
2001 2003, the authority of granting production forest 
utilization permit was delegated to the local government 
(Ministry Regulation Number 10.1/2001).  However, due to 
rampant corruption related to the local government 
permission granting, the authority was returned to the 
government in accordance to the Decree of the Minister of 
Forestry Number 32/2003. According to Dewi et al. (2010), 
the division of authority needs a clear responsibility so that 
public services can work well
Forest production is a part of the state forest. The 
characteristics of the forest resources lead to the inter-
stakeholders and inter-regional mutual dependence/ 
−
.
interdependence (Ostrom 2008). One of the efforts to 
suppress the interdependence is the arrangement of 
ownership rights as part of forest management rules. The 
transfer of authority does not eliminate the state function to 
conduct supervision. A state function as regulator including 
resource management has been defined by several experts, 
including Harold J. Laski and Robert M. Maclver (Budiardjo 
2007). The principle of the existence state is the authority to 
regulate state.  Through the concept of the welfare state, the 
state has a function to create prosperity through the 
fulfillment of the public interest (Ilmar 2012).  In the 
management of forest resources, the state existence is to 
regulate the forest utilization, party distribution, and forest 
utilization rights.
Forest control by the state has put the state as the party that 
regulates the forest management (Kartodihardjo & Jhamtani 
2006).  Forest control is intended as a state authority to 
regulate and manage all matters related to forest, forest area 
and forest products; regulate and establish the legal 
relationship between the people with forest or forest area and 
forest products, as well as regulate legal actions concerning 
forestry (Act Number 41/1999). One of the state regulation is 
implemented in the issuance of forest timber product 
exploitation permit. Permit granted during the 
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decentralization era has put local governments in an 
enormous power (Zuhro 2013). However, the authority is 
still under the central government control.  Although there is 
a local involvement in the permit issuance, the central 
government authority remains greater.
The study of government authority in the forest utilization 
has been done by several researchers, including Barr (1999), 
Kartodihardjo (1998), and Nugroho (2003). Research 
describe the government's authority in the utilization of 
natural forests and the relationship between the government 
and firm. Studies reviewed in this paper see the government's 
authority in the development of industrial plantation forests.
Based on the before description, the proposed research 
question is how to post the state/country in the industrial 
plantation forest development (Rawls 1995; Ali & Lino 
2013).  The state position is intended as a role of the state in 
the implementation of industrial plantation forest 
development.  The purpose of this study is to reveal the state 
position, in this case is the Ministry of Forestry, in the 
industrial plantation forest development
structivist paradigm (Denzim & Lincoln 1997: Irawan 
2007) which constructed the delegation of authority in the 
industrial plantation forest development. The construction of 
social process was conducted using phenomenology method 
(Moran 2000), a method that reveals the phenomenon by 
engaging informants as a primary source of information.  The 
data collection process was conducted through in-depth 
interviews (Denzim & Lincoln 1997), in which extract the 
understanding that illustrates the value, perception and 
attitude of informants toward a process that becomes a major 
goal in the interview. Data were also obtained from the 
analysis of laws/acts and regulations that regulate the 
industrial plantation forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri, HTI) 
development
The field research was conducted in 2012 in Riau 
Province. The study site was selected based on the area of 
industrial plantation forest. According to the Ministry of 
Forestry, there are 1.6 million industrial plantation forest in 
Riau Province. In addition, there are also two large pulp and 
paper industries which have 3.9 million tons production 
capacity equivalent to 74% of the national pulp and paper 
productions (Forestry 2011).  The key informants were 
actors involved directly or indirectly in the transfer of 
authority to grant permits on the development of industrial 
plantation forests.  These informants were working in the 
government institutions (Ministry of Forestry, Riau Province 
Forestry Agency, and Pelalawan City Forestry Agency), 
forest entrepreneurs and forest contractors.
Documents being used as study materials were the legal 
documents of Forestry Law (Act Number 41/1999), PP 
Number 6/1999, PP Number 34/2002, PP Number 6/2007, 
and PP Number 3/2008; the Minister of Forestry Regulation 
that regulates operational cooperation namely Minister 
Regulation Number P.20/2005 jo P.37/2009 jo P.29/2012; 
and the documents of cooperation agreement in the 
implementation of operational cooperation; as well as the 
documents of industrial plantation forest development with 
.  
.
Methods 
T
con
his study used a qualitative approach with a 
the contractor.  Legal document was analysis conducted 
through content analysis (Berger 1991; Khan et al. 2010).  
Phenomenological data was analysis included several stage 
process namaly; horizonalization, reduction and elimination; 
tektural description, structural description and determination 
of significance stages (Moustakas 1994; Kuswarno 2009).
In conducting the regulatory function of the statehood 
(Aji 2013), the state has the authority to control/manage 
forest resources for the greatest welfare of people. The 
controlling authority is held by the Ministry of Forestry as a 
state representative.  This form of control is appeared in the 
forest administration, forest utilization, and management 
(Act Number 41/1999).  Forest administration is the 
responsibility of government which is conducted through the 
implementation of: (a) forest planning, (b) forest 
management, (c) research and development, education and 
training and forestry extension, and d) supervision.  Forest 
administration is jointly conducted between the government 
and local governments.  Meanwhile, one of the forest 
management activities that are part of the government's 
responsibility is forest utilization
Forest utilization through permission granted is a form of 
transfer of rights from the state/Minister of Forestry 
(principal) to the individual/cooperative/state/private who 
acts as agents. Principal-agent relationship is a relationship 
that one or more people as the trust grantors/principals affect 
others as partners who receive the trust to conduct several 
principal tasks by delegating decision-making authority to 
the appointed partners (Miller 2008).  Meanwhile, according 
to Eggertsson (1990), the principal-agent relationship is a 
hierarchical relationship or exchange of property rights 
among individuals.  This is a utilization permission of forest 
timber products (PP Number 34/2002 jo PP. 6/2007 jo PP. 
3/2008), which are all forms of businesses that utilize and 
commercialize forest timber products without harming the 
environment and do not reduce the forest principal function.  
The purpose of utilization permission granting is to increase 
the forest values, provide industrial raw materials and create 
employment/job (Srihadiono 2005). The improper/bad forest 
utilization is associated with high rates of deforestation 
(Amsberg 1998) and revenues (Soedomo 2013).  
Characteristics of forest timber product exploitation/ 
utilization permit which is regulated in the forestry 
regulations are shown in 
Delegation of authority and rights amendment Production 
forest is a state forest.  State ownership is one of property 
right forms.  Property right is the right of the individual, 
society, or nation over a resource (asset/ endowment) to 
manage, utilize, transfer, even impair it.  These rights consist 
of the right to private property, state property, communal 
property, common property, and no owner/open access 
property (Ostrom 1990).  The authority of the state in forest 
management rights is bound in a mutually attached rights in 
the bundle of rights (Ostrom & Schlager 1992) which 
consists of access right, withdrawal right, management right, 
exclusion right and alienation right.  Research about bundle 
of rights have done by Arsyad et al. (2007).
Results and Discussion
.
Table 1.
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Delegation of authority of production forest utilization 
implicates to the change of rights attached to the state and 
business actors. This delegation does not change the 
ownership of forest, but it only bestows/delegates the state 
rights according to the bundle of rights. The forest state 
property right is an institutional set that regulates the 
occuring interactions between stakeholder in the production 
forest utilization (Behera & Engel 2006).  Delegation of 
authority from the state to the business actors to develop 
industrial plantation forest is conducted through three stage 
relationships namely relationship between the Ministry of 
Forestry with IUPHHK-HT holders (a principal-agent), the 
relationship between IUPHHK-HT holder with operational 
cooperation (KSO) or IUPHHK-HT holder with contractor, 
and the relationship between the operational cooperation 
practitioners with contractor of industrial plantation forest 
development. The principal-agent relationship in the 
industrial plantation forest development has been studied by 
Nugroho (2003) in natural forest management right (Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH).  Principal-agent relationship in 
the utilization of natural forest was conducted through three 
stages involving government, forest utilization permission 
holders, and contractors.  Principal-agent relationship occurs 
in the industrial plantation forest development which is 
related to the permission granting process of IUPHHK-HT, 
where the principal does not have perfect information on the 
existence of forest resources and IUPHHK-HT holders.
1. Delegation of the state authority to IUPHHK-HT 
holder
Delegation of the state authority to IUPHHK-HT holder 
in the form of permission is known as Timber Forest Product-
Plan Forest Utilization Permit (Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan 
Hasil Hutan Kayu Hutan Tanaman, IUPHHK-HT). This 
permission is given through a request and issued subsequrent 
IUPHHK-HT assessment letter containing the provisions, 
rights, obligations and prohibitions of IUPHHK-HT holder.  
The utilization permit is a valid legal document or 
permissibility of a person.  This permit to conduct certain 
business or activity.  The permission consists of permit, 
dispensation, license, concession, and recommendation 
(Dewa 2011).
This delegation of authority is to transfer rights of access, 
withdraw, management, and exclusion from the Ministry of 
Forestry to IUPHHK-HT holder ( 2). The process of 
authority delegation is not followed by the transferring right 
Table 
to trade (alienation right) the forest area.  The right that is 
held by IUPHHK-HT holder is the access right to utilize 
forest resources to develop industrial plantation forest.  
Although this right has been given to IUPHHK-HT holders, 
local communities also still have the access right to utilize 
non-subtractive forest products.  The arrangement of access 
right is determined by the IUPHHK-HT holder.  Meanwhile, 
the right to utilize forest products in the region as well as the 
right to delegate others to conduct forest products utilization, 
are authorized to IUPHHK-HT holder.  Thus, the delegation 
of this authority entitles the IUPHHK-HT holder to conduct 
forest products utilization and regulate the access of others.
Delegation of authority put the forest area as a state asset, 
but the planted trees as permit holder asset.  Separating of 
forest asset between state and permit holder is contained in 
the IUPHHK-HT Decree. The IUPHHK-HT Decree 
establishes IUPHHK-HT holder as a party who is prohibited 
to perform a contract or hand over all or some part of the 
business activities to other parties without the approval of the 
minister of forestry. The prohibition is a form of state 
supervision to the forest area.  According to Sukarmi (2011), 
an agreement or contract in the business implementation can 
lead to monopoly.  The monopoly takes place through the 
acquisition of shares by a large company. Symptoms mastery 
IUPHHK-HT is a phenomenon that occurs in the 
development of plantation forests. The possibility of 
monopoly occurence is the state responsibility, thus the state 
must conduct a supervision in order to improve the welfare.
The state function after transferring authority is to 
supervise the process of industrial plantation forest 
development and the state revenues (Handadhari et al. 2005).  
The state revenue from the reforestation fund (Dana 
Reboisasi, DR) and the provision of forest resources (Provisi 
Sumber Daya Hutan, PSDH) is a tool to achieve the state 
welfare goal. Reforestation funds obtained from the clearing 
of natural forests into industrial  plantations forest, whereas 
provision of forest resources comes from plantations.  The 
supervision is conducted by the technical implementation 
unit (Unit Pelaksana Teknis, UPT) of the Ministry of Forestry 
which is located in the regional district.  This technical 
implementation unit namely the Center for Forest Area 
Consolidation (Balai Pemantapan Kawasan Hutan, BPKH)  
and the Center for Supervision of Production Forest 
Exploitation (Balai Pemantauan Pemanfaatan Hutan 
Produksi, BP2HP).  The BPKH is the technical 
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Table 1 Characteristics of Forest Timber Product Exploitation Permit on Planted Forest (IUPHHK-HT)
 Permit characteristics  Explanation  
   
 
  
 
Concession period
   
 
Transfer of rights
  
 
Party who have authority to grant permission for IUPHHK-HT is the Minister of Forestry with the 
recommendation from the governor and on the consideration from the regent/mayor. 
Granting permission in the form of IUPHHK-HT is conducted through solicitation by businesses to the 
Minister of Forestry. 
Parties who can apply for permission to obtain IUPHHK-HT are individual, cooperative, local/state 
enterprises (BUMD/BUMN), and private enterprise (BUMS).
IUPHHK-HT concession period is 60 years and can be extended once for 35 years. 
Transfer of rights to exploit forest can be conducted after permit grantor issues written approval. 
How to obtain a permit
IUPHHK-HT permit grantor
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implementation unit of the Directorate General of Forest 
Planning.  Whereas, The BKPH as a technical 
implementation unit of Directorate General of Forestry 
Enterprises, Ministry of Forestry.  The role of the BPKH in 
the industrial plantation forest development is to provide 
recommendations on the function and status of the forest area 
that will be proposed into industrial plantation forest.  
Meanwhile, BP2HP has a role in monitoring forest products 
exploited from the production forest.
The supervision which is conducted by the Ministry of 
Forestry after transferring authority only includes the 
supervision of state revenue obtained in the industrial 
plantation forest development.  This form of supervision also 
involves Provincial and District Forestry Agencies.  The 
involvement of local government in the supervision is solely 
an administrative manner (Ekawati 2010).  Monitoring of 
forest condition is in a mere administrative supervision as if it 
is not conducted by the government or local government.
The principal-agent relationship in the delegation of 
authority on the production forest utilization has some 
impacts associated with the transfer of rights, asymmetric 
information and transaction costs. The impact of the 
principal-agent relationship can be reduced by selecting the 
right agent. In the development of industrial plantation 
forests, this impact caused by the transfer of rights.  Transfer 
of rights that occurs is a transfer of access right, withdrawal 
right and management right to IUPHHK-HT holder. This 
transfer is not free from other party claims.  Several cases in 
the industrial plantation forest development in Riau reveal a 
conflict caused by unclear status of forest area.  Negotiation 
process is required (Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014) to resolve these 
claims and it is a social issue that becomes the responsibility 
of IUPHHK-HT holder.  Claims of local community over 
IUPHHK-HT region is generating cost for IUPHHK-HT 
holder.  This cost appears to resolve the conflict.
The impact of principal-agent relationship in the 
industrial plantation forest development is also derived from 
the presence of asymmetric information that is caused by 
principal (goverment) ignorance regarding to the forest 
details.  Information about the ecology and social condition 
of the forest area is owned by the agen (IUPHHK-HT holder).  
In addition, the principal-agent relationship in the industrial 
plantation forest development also contributes to the high 
transaction costs in the process of obtaining IUPHHK-HT 
permit.  The process of obtaining IUPHHK-HT permit 
involves central and local agencies. These process followed 
by the lack of process transparency can lead to the high 
transaction costs (Williamson 2008). The high transaction 
costs due to the long process to obtaining  of IUPHHK-HT 
permit.
2. Delegation of authority of IUPHHK-HT holder to 
operational cooperation practitioners
Delegation of operational authority to the industrial 
plantation forest development by IUPHHK-HT holder to 
contractors or operational cooperation practitioners is 
conducted through an operational cooperation (KSO).  This 
delegation agreement by IUPHHK-HT holder who has the 
financial ability to implement industrial plantation forest 
development activities.  While the delegation of authority 
through the operational cooperation is conducted by 
IUPHHK-HT holder who does not have the financial ability. 
The characteristics of IUPHHK-HT holder is correlated with 
IUPHHK-HT issuance that involves rent-seekers.  The rent-
seeker is pursuing profit by exploiting the potential of natural 
timbers from forest areas.  Typology of IUPHHK-HT holder 
in the industrial plantation forest development can be divided 
into three type, namely (1) IUPHHK-HT holder who is 
capable of conducting independent industrial plantation 
forest development, (2) IUPHHK-HT holder who does not 
have the ability to develop industrial plantation forest and 
then to perform operational cooperation, and (3) IUPHHK-
HT holder who does not have the financial ability and then 
selling IUPHHK-HT to big entrepreneur/businessman. 
Typology of IUPHHK-HT holder is correlated with the 
permission granting process by the government (Oliveira 
2008).
Delegation of authority by IUPHHK-HT holder through 
the operational cooperation is based on the Minister of 
Forestry Regulation Number P.20/2005 jo P.37/2009 jo 
P.29/2012.  This delegation is allegedly caused by 
entrepreneurs pressure to legalize operational cooperation 
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Stakeholder
 
Bundle of rights
1
 
Access 
right
1)
 
Withdrawal 
right
2)
 
Management 
right
3)
 
Exclusion 
right
4)
 
Alienation 
right
5)
 
 
Ministry of Forestry
 
√
 
√
 
√
 
√
 
√
 
 
IUPHHK-HT holder
  
√
 
√
 
√
 
√
 
-
 
 
Operational cooperation practitioner
  √
 
√
 
√
 
-
 
-
 
 
Contractor  
√  √  √  -  -
 
Table 2 Changes in Bundle of Right after IUPHHK-HT issuance by Ministry of Foresty to IUPHHK-HT holders
 
Remarks :
√= Reserve the right              
1
 
Bundle of right
 
consists of:
 
1)  
The right to physically enter the forest and enjoy non-subtractive benefits
 
2)  The right to receive the benefits of forest products, such as utilizing  forest timber  products or non-timber
3)
 The right to  regulate internal utilization  patterns and resources  transformation  through improvements
4)
 The right to  determine who has  an  access rights and how these rights are allowed to be transferred
5)
 
The right to sell or the other or both of above collective choice rights.
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conducted by IUPHHK-HT holder.  The case of the pressure 
on the policy process has been studied by Rumboko et al. 
(2013). This pressure changes the contain of Forestry 
Ministry Regulation.  The ministerial regulation changes are 
simply changing the scope of the implementation of 
operational cooperation.  Meanwhile, the operational 
cooperation agreement contains matters related to the 
responsibility agreement of IUPHHK-HT holder and 
operational cooperation practitioners. Another agreement to 
control sale of forest products to the pulp and paper industry 
owners, the duration of implementation of operational 
cooperation and the selling price agreement of timber 
obtained from industrial plantation forest.  KSO is a form of 
the distribution of responsibilities among parties in the 
industrial plantation forest development. The distribution of 
these responsibilities can be described as follows, IUPHHK-
HT holder has the responsibility to make the forest plan.  
That resposibility includes to set up of IUPHHK-HT 
concession boundaries, the preparation of the General Work 
Plan (Rencana Karya Umum, RKU) within 10 years period, 
macro and micro delineation, Comprehensive Periodic 
Forest Inventory (Inventarisasi Hutan Menyeluruh Berkala, 
IHMB), and Annual Work Plan (Rencana Karya Tahunan, 
RKT).  Macro and micro delinneation is a policy to regulate 
the development of industrial plantation forest  from natural 
forest.  KSO practitioners are responsible of the capital (as 
IUPHHK-HT holder with large capital). KSO practioners as 
a party that is entered into agreements with IUPHHK-HT-
holders.  Contractor as a party that is entered into the 
agreement to establish industrial plantation forest.  The 
contractor is responsible  to establish as determined by the 
operational cooperation practitioners. Delegation of 
authority by IUPHHK-HT holder to cooperation 
practitioners or contractor could result in the change of rights 
as listed in Table 2. The right held by the operational 
cooperation practitioners or contractor is access rights, 
withdrawal rights, and the management rights, which 
conducts industrial plantation forest development.  
Whereas, the exclusion rights remain as IUPHHK-HT 
holder rights.
3. Delegation of authority to the contractor 
Three-level relationships (Nugroho 2003) in the 
development of industrial plantation forest are principal-
agent relationships between IUPHHK-HT stakeholders or 
operational cooperation and the contractor. Contractor 
consists of nursery contractor, land preparation, and planting 
contractor, as well as logging and transporting contractors.  
Authority possessed by these contractors is only to conduct 
work which is in accordance to the agreements. In these 
three-level relationships, the transfer of rights from 
IUPHHK-HT holder or operational cooperation to the 
contractor is the access rights, withdrawal rights, and the 
management rights. The transfer of authority to the 
contractor does not transfer liability of IUPHHK-HT holder.  
Agreement between the government and IUPHHK-HT 
holder remains IUPHHK-HT holder's responsibility.
The state position Principal-agent relationship (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976) in the development of industrial plantation 
forests is a form of temporary transfer of rights.  The 
delegation of right requires supervision to maintain the status 
of bestowed forest.  Supervision is conducted by the Ministry 
of Forestry and Provincial and District Forestry Agency.  
This supervision is important to maintain supply raw 
material from industrial plantation forest to the pulp and 
paper industries, because these industries have bright 
economic prospects (Alfarisi 2009).
The authority in the development of industrial plantation 
forest has undergone a change of property right. IUPHHK-
HT holder delegates some parts of operational activities of 
industrial plantation forest development to the operational 
cooperation practitioners or contractor. Delegation to the 
contractor affects to the inability of the Ministry of Forestry 
to conduct a direct supervision. This delegation is caused by 
high transaction costs abtain IUPHHK-HT permit and to 
establish industrial plantation forest. According to Kim and 
Mahoney (2005), property right is related to the structure of 
incentives provided.  Delegation of authority with three level 
relationships become disincentives to development 
industrial plantation forest.  The form of property right with 
the state forest status and the withdrawal right granted by the 
state has led to the higher transaction costs.  The occurence of 
these transaction costs acts as a disincentive to the 
development of industrial plantation forest.
Although government incentives through equity 
participation and indirect incentives such as Land 
Conversion Permit (Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu, IPK) have been 
given, it could not drive the behavior of IUPHHK-HT 
holders to comply with the prohibition of the transfer of 
development activities to the other parties.  IUPHHK-HT 
holders more instresting to get revenue from land conversion 
permint.  IPK is a license to carry out logging of natural 
forests.  This permit has an impact on the coverage of 
surveillance conducted by the ministry of forestry which 
failed to reach the operational cooperation practitioners or 
contractor. The ministry of forestry can not directly 
surveillance the operational cooperations practitioners and 
contractor.  Surveillance of the ministry of forestry only to 
the IUPHHK-HT holder.
The delegation of authority by IUPHHK-HT holder to the 
operational cooperation practitioners or the contractors is 
due to the non-compliance of IUPHHK-HT holder. The non-
compliance to the rules stated by the ministry of forestry in 
IUPHHK-HT decree. The statement of the IUPHHK-HT 
decree declare that operational cooperational must be 
approved by ministry of  forestry.  However, no operational 
cooperation practitioners approved by ministry of forestry.
The incompetence of IUPHHK-HT holder to operate in 
the development of industrial plantation forest becomes the 
cause of the operational cooperation.  Ministry of Forestry as 
the principal does not understand the agent's capability, both 
technical and financial capabilities. This is due to the 
permission system which is only observed from the 
administrative requirements (Muallidin 2012).  Ministry of 
forestry remains unknows in details information regarding to 
the applicant conditions.  Consequently, delegation of 
authority granted to IUPHHK-HT holder does not comply 
with the requirements outlined by the Ministry of Forestry.
The authority delegation of IUPHHK-HT holder to the 
operational cooperation practitioners and contractor can lead 
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to the failure. This failure is achieving industrial plantation 
forest development to reduce poverty (Rumboko 2013).  
Delegation is also causing an ineffective supervision 
conducted by the ministry of forestry. Although the ministry 
of forestry has the technical implementation unit (Unit 
Pelaksana Teknis, UPT) in the area consisting BPKH and 
BP2HP, supervision is only conducted in administrative 
manner. Similarly, the provincial forest agency and district 
forest agency are only conducting administrative 
supervision.  In the long term, the delegation of authority 
which involves the change of rights and inefficient principal-
agent relationship can cause a decrease in soil fertility 
conditions of industrial plantation forest (Wasis 2004). The 
development of industrial plantation forest enters three 
rotations and subsequently experiences the decreased in 
financial advisability (Sudarmalik 2008). Rotations is the 
time it takes from planting to harvest. Each rotation takes 5 
years.
Delegation of authority followed by principal-agent 
relationship between IUPHHK-HT shareholders with 
operational cooperation practitioners and operational 
cooperation practitioners with the contractor occurs as if 
there is no one taking responsibility of forest areas.  
Consequently, there is no guarantee over the sustainability of 
industrial plantation forest development. 
Conclusion 
Delegation of authority in industrial plantation forest 
development through the provision of utilization rights with 
the principal-agent relationship that exists today does not 
guarantee the preservation of forest land.  The created 
principal-agent relationship causing the state supervision 
does not reach activity practitioners in the field.
Recommendation
It is necessary to conduct a strict supervision by the 
Ministry of Forestry toward the development of industrial 
plantation forest that delegates the development authority of 
industrial plantation forest through operational cooperation.
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